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The American  farm problem  was treated for decades  as if it were
of temporary nature.  The policy means  used, except  during  wartime
and regardless  of  the  administration,  largely  assumed  implicitly  that
temporary measures  would  "see  us  through"  a  few  abnormal  years,
then we  could readily return to  "equilibrium and normal conditions."
But it is now obvious that the problem is not a temporary one.
OUTLOOK  FOR  U. S. AGRICULTURE
The problem of supply which is large relative to domestic demand
will continue  through  this decade,  pushing  downward  on farm prices
and income.  At high  stages  of economic  development,  food supply
tends  somewhat  automatically  to  increase  more  rapidly  than  food
demand,  for these  reasons:
1. The structure  of agriculture  shifts  more  to a  capital  intensive
basis  under  growth  and  advanced  development.  At  low  stages  of
growth,  the major input is labor;  at high stages  of growth,  the major
input is  capital.  For example,  total inputs of  U.  S. agriculture  were
composed  of approximately  75  percent labor  and 25  percent  capital
in  1910.  By  1960,  the  proportions  were  nearly  reversed,  having
changed  to 70 percent  capital, including  land,  and 30 percent  labor.
2.  A shift of the largest proportion of inputs to capital is important
because it increases incentive to lower the prices of materials or capital
resources  which  substitute for and increase the  productivity  of labor
and  land.  The  nonfarm  industries  can  produce,  package,  and  sell
capital  inputs  to  farmers.  They  not  only  have  a  broader  base  and
incentive  for producing  items  or materials  which  improve  the  tech-
nology of farming,  but they have  equal  incentive  for communicating
knowledge  of  new  technology  to  farmers.  Private  firms  now  spend
more  on  technical  research  for  agriculture  and  the  communication
of  knowledge  (if  all  outlays  for  salesmen,  advertising,  etc.,  are  in-
cluded)  than  the  agricultural  colleges  and the  U.  S. Department  of
Agriculture.
3.  The nonfarm  sector  is likely  to  intensify  its  effort  to develop
new  technical knowledge  for agriculture  because  the two major vari-
ables  affecting  the  profitability  in use  of  (the  demand  for)  capital
representing  technology  are  the  productivity  and  the  price  of  the
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senting  capital items  to be  retailed,  which have higher  productivities.
4.  Research in the agricultural colleges and the USDA will become
more effective in promoting  supply  growth.  Two  factors  lead  in this
direction.  One  is  the  accumulation  of  scientific  knowledge,  with  its
compounding  in  the unleashing  of further  knowledge  contributing  to
greater productivity.  The other is an enlarged world-wide investment in
technical knowledge,  which has  a high transportability  among nations.
5.  The  increased  specialization  and  commercialization  of  agri-
culture  will  result  in more rapid  growth  in agricultural  productivity.
Not only are farm people becoming  better educated,  but also the more
alert and able managers  have the industry concentrating  in their hands.
6.  Finally, causes rooted in world political,  economic, and humani-
tarian  considerations  will  force  the  United  States  to  emphasize  a
sustained  or  greater  tempo  of  economic  growth.  Agriculture  cannot
escape  being  caught  up  in  this  growth.
While the productivity  of agriculture  can be expected  to increase
rapidly  during  the  1960's  and  into  the  following  decade,  domestic
demand  for  food  in  aggregate  will  be  restricted  to  nearly  the  rate
of  population  growth.  The food  supply function  is thus  expected  to
continue  forward  at  a  rate  exceeding  that  of  demand.  Under  this
situation,  agricultural  prices  and  income  can  be  maintained,  in  the
absence  of  compensating  policy,  only  as  the  growth  in  productivity
of  new  capital  resources  or  technology  introduced  into  agriculture
serve  to  decrease  the  demand  for  labor,  land,  and  capital  items  of
conventional  forms.  Since  labor,  land,  and  old  capital  are  of  low
mobility,  these  resources  will  remain  in  farming  at  low  prices  or
realized  returns.  These  low  prices  or  returns  cause  employment  to
be  large  and  output  to be  great  relative  to  consumer  demand.  The
result  is  depressed  farm  prices  and  incomes.
Without  large increments in foreign demand, this is the underlying
or structural  prospect for  the  1960's.  Public  policy  may  be used, of
course,  to change  the underlying  structural forces.  Even  on the basis
of  currently  known  technology,  production  could  grow  to levels  re-
quired  by  a  population  of  230  million  in  1975,  while  land  input
could decline  by  about  28  million acres  as compared  with  1958-59.1
Projections  to the international  market  are more precarious,  par-
ticularly  on  the  side  of  demand  for  U.  S.  farm  products.  World
economic  development  and  population  growth  are not likely to press
1 0.  R.  Rogers  and G.  T. Barton,  "Our Farm  Production  Potential,  1975."  U.  S.
Dept. of  Agriculture,  Agr.  Info.  Bul.  233.
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farm output or cause a general draw of labor resources into agriculture.
Two factors will prevent such a situation:  ( 1  )  Less developed countries
will prefer to encourage  economic  growth and technical  development
in their own agriculture,  rather than to become increasingly dependent
on imports from the U.  S.  (2)  More  developed countries,  aside  from
the  U.  S.,  and  conventional  surplus  countries  such  as  Canada  and
Australia,  are  currently  in  growth  stages  where  farm  output  is  in-
creasing  more rapidly than population  and demand.  For example,  in
Western  Europe,  supply  may  increase  as  much  as  50  percent  more
rapidly than domestic  demand over the next decade.2
THE  RESOURCE  PROBLEM
New capital  forms or  innovations  will continue  to  substitute  for
labor and land, causing the absolute demand for labor and the relative
demand for land to decline.  Some work that I have done on marginal
rates  of  substitution  shows  that  one  ton  of  fertilizer  can  substitute
for 23 acres of land and 60 days of labor.  Similar rates of substitution
for other  innovations,  if not for fertilizer,  are likely in future decades.
If  labor,  land  for  particular  uses,  and  old  capital  forms  were
readily transferable  out of agriculture,  the price and income problems
of agriculture  would not arise.  In this sense,  the farm problem  is one
of  factor  supply  in  agriculture.  Increase  the  elasticity  of  supply  of
these  resources  to  agriculture  over the  next  decade,  and  the related
farm output,  price,  and income problems  would be diminished.  This
outcome  can  be  a  major  goal  of  policy,  and  numerous  means  can
be used to attain it over the long run.  We use the qualification long run
since  the  resources  involved  typically  are  highly  inflexible  in  their
employment  opportunities.  Involved  are labor  resources  representing
middle-aged  or older  people  whose  life  experiences  are  tied to  agri-
culture  and who have too few skills to take with them to other indus-
tries.  Involved,  too,  is land which  cannot be converted from  surplus
crops  to  other  uses  with better  demand  prospects  (such  as  forestry,
recreation,  and grazing)  without large  sacrifice  in income and  capital
investment  and  a  great  cost  in  time  for  conversion.  Also  involved
are  buildings  and  other  fixed  capital  items  which  have  little  or  no
use value in other industries.
Among  the  acceptable  policy  means  for  resource  adjustment  are
education  and  guidance  of  farm  youth  and their  parents,  land with-
drawal,  and  even  transfer  payments  and  loans  for  labor  resources.
But the problem  transcends  the farm  industry  and  relates  equally to
2 George  Allen,  "International  Policies  Relating  to  Agriculture,"  Ames,  Iowa,
July  1960.  Ditto.
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communities  of  regions  oriented  toward  agriculture.  The  nonfarm
resources  involved  are  no  less  important  than  those  of  agriculture,
but have  been  too  largely overlooked  in farm  policy.  The  result  of
this  oversight  has  been  the  rejection  of  farm  policies  which  might
have otherwise met with public  acceptance and facilitated  a healthier
supply  and  income  structure  for  agriculture.  Hence,  broader  social
policy  is needed  if the more  basic  problems  of  agriculture  are to be
solved  over  the next  decade  or more.
PROBLEMS  IN  POSITIVE-SUM  UTILITY  OUTCOMES
Earlier  in the  nation's  history,  a  basic  national problem  was  at-
taining  rapid  development  of  agriculture.  Such  growth  was  needed
especially  to  increase per  capita  income  in  a nation  which  had  the
majority of its resources  and consumers  in agriculture.  The  situation
was  such  that  technical  development  in  agriculture  generally  bene-
fited  both  farm  producers  and  food  consumers.  The  majority  of
consumers  were  on the  farm  and  gained  accordingly;  nonfarm  con-
sumers  gained in  a  lower  real price  of food.  In  addition,  a  relative
saving  of resources  occurred  and  an  absolute  transfer  of labor  from
agriculture permitted  production  of more of other goods and  services
from  a given  stock  of  resources.  But we  are  now  at a  point where
rapid technical  advance  in agriculture  can benefit  consumers  through
a declining budget outlay and real price for food, while farm producers
in aggregate sacrifice in income level.  I consider this to be the essential
policy  problem  of  the  1960's:  development  within  agriculture  to
correspond  with  national  economic  growth  goals,  but  with  policy
which  guarantees  positive-sum  utility  outcomes  over  the  two  broad
groups,  farmers  and consumers.
Technical progress  of agriculture now can make only a small rela-
tive contribution through a surplus of income over consumption to pro-
vide a capital base for industrialization or transfer  of labor force from
agriculture to industry.  Farming has shrunk to such a small proportion
of the nation's economy that the major sources  for growth stimuli now
lie  in  other  sectors  of  the  economy.  The urgency  for  technical  and
organizational  advance,  to  facilitate  national  economic  growth,  has
shifted to fields such as education, industry, and the services.  Technical
and  supply advance which reduced even the  1920 farm labor force of
12.5  million to half by  1960, and  allowed  addition  of this labor to a
national labor force of  40 millions had great impact  on general  eco-
nomic growth.  But advance which frees half of a  1961  labor force  of
6 million, and adds it to a 70 million national labor force, has much less
impact.  Only  about 8 percent  of the nation's labor force,  and about
7 percent of its capital now is employed in agriculture.
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sectors  in resources  employed  and  contribution  to  national  income.
But  a policy  is  needed  to  guarantee  that  farm producers  gain  some
share of the general economic progress to which they contribute.  Some
farm producers  may gain in income even while the group  as a whole
sacrifices.  Similarly,  the  nonfarm  consumer  group  located  in  rural
areas  with incomes tied directly to prosperity of agriculture may suffer
while the nation's consumers gain  from greater supply and lower  real
price of food.  Resolution of these gain and loss conflicts is the foremost
policy problem of agriculture during the next decade.  Political accept-
ance  or rejection  of  particular  policies  largely  reflects  the  extent  to
which these gains and sacrifices are adequately recognized  and treated
in programs.
Some  of the farm  population  are unwilling to  accept rigid  quotas
or supply controls because such controls would cause them to sacrifice
(or gain  less)  to give others  the benefits  of progress.  Others  are un-
willing to accept an unrestricted market and its particular distribution
of the gains  and losses  from technical  advance and inelastic demand.
Therefore,  a single policy mold for the nation, as frequently attempted
in the past, is unacceptable or unworkable.  A national policy consist-
ing of a single program brings differential gains and sacrifices to differ-
ent  regions.  Consequently,  "side  payments"  arise  in  the  form  of
"trades"  between regions.  This  frequently  nullifies the program.  An
example was the  acreage control programs  without cross-compliance.
The  "side  payments"  allowed  cotton producers  to plant feed  grains,
wheat farmers to shift land to grain sorghums, and feed grain producers
to plant small acreages of wheat.
Conceptually,  agricultural  policy  is  formulated  partly  within  a
framework  of  "what I  gain,  you lose."  We  have  two "persons,"  the
consumer  versus  the producer;  or two  "persons"  in  the  form  of the
farmer who can increase output only by a smaller proportion than net
price declines  and, therefore, loses versus the farmer who can increase
output by a greater  proportion  and  gains from increased  output even
with  lower  price.  This  situation  leads  to  policies  which  attempt to
compensate  those who  lose; or to  check  supply  so that producers  in
general  gain  from  greater  income  while  consumers  gain  from lower
real  prices  for  food.8
3 Because  of the  inelastic  demand  under  economic development  which gives  rise
to the  two "persons,"  agricultural  policy can be  represented  as  a two-person  zero-sum
game.  But  once  public  appropriations  have  been  made  for  eliminating  the  uncer-
tainty of aggregate  utility outcomes under  the zero-sum game  framework, the political
and economic  process in public  decision  making then approaches  an n-person  positive-
sum  game.  It  is  n-person  in  the  sense  that more  than  two  groups  (individuals)  are
concerned  and  the  strategies  to maximize  gain  by  a  single  group  must  be changed.
It is positive-sum  in the sense that a given amount of program  funds is to be distributed
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sumers  and the general economy  to gain while a portion of the contri-
bution to progress is retained by farm producers  are certainly possible.
We outline some possible elements  of such programs  in a forthcoming
book,  Agricultural Policy  Under Economic  Development,  Chapters
8-16.
The two extreme propositions for economic  growth are adjustment
of agriculture and the distribution of gains.  At one extreme is the pro-
posal to turn prices  loose in the market and  freely  squeeze  labor out
of  the industry.  The other  extreme  proposition  is  to freeze  the  farm
size and labor structure  of the industry,  a sort of  "Indian reservation"
policy,  to keep the structure  and population  as it was in the past, as  a
national museum of the nation's heritage.
SPECIFIC  POLICIES
A reasonable proposition  is that the basic and very  strong forces
of national economic growth  will override all policy restraints of agri-
culture in the next two decades.  With a continued increase in the price
of labor relative to the price of capital,  substitution of capital for labor
will continue throughout the economy.  Mechanization  of farming will
be  further  encouraged  for  this reason,  and  the  number  of farms  will
decrease  still  further.  Similarly,  the  high  labor  rewards  in nonfarm
industry will pull more people out of agriculture,  particularly in those
regions where farm earnings  are low.  Aside from outright prohibition
of  migration  and  constraining  the  production  pattern  to  that  of the
present,  the  forces  of national  economic  growth  will take  us  in this
direction,  and  agricultural  policy  might  best be geared  to this devel-
oping pattern.  Further, I doubt that the values of farm people dictate
otherwise for the long run.  True, this generation of farm operators does
not want  to bear  losses  from economic  development  to give  the con-
suming society the benefits of a lower food budget.  Evidently farmers
in aggregate, for their own generation,  prefer some form of compensa-
tion to override the sacrifices or costs that otherwise  fall on them as  a
result  of  progress.  But  farm  families  show  no  evidence  of  insisting
upon the maintenance of a structure of agriculture  which freezes their
children  in agriculture.  The  historic  evidence  points  in the  opposite
direction,  with  a major  increment  in  the nation's  labor  force having
and  one group does  not "pay out" if it loses,  but only fails to  receive a  portion  (or as
large a proportion)  of the quantity to be distributed.  While much of the political struggle
may  be  in  this  framework  of  an  n-person  positive-sum  game  (with  industries  and
sectors  related  to  agriculture  strenuously  in  the  "game"  to  claim  a  proportion  of the
public  "payoff"),  with  various  interest  groups  attempting  to  maximize  gain  from  a
given  appropriation  and  to  accomplish  program  trades  toward  this  end,  the  more
essential  task over  the next  decade  is  to  attain  policy  which  more  nearly  corrects  the
possibility  of negative-sum  utility outcomes  which  result.
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opportunities  in nonfarm  occupations which promise highest rewards.
Resistance to particular policies stems from expected or actual dis-
tribution of gains and losses resulting from them.  As mentioned previ-
ously,  the free market distribution of gains and losses under economic
progress has not been acceptable to the general farm public.  We have
no  basis  for  saying  that  the  gain  in  utility  to  the  gaining  groups  is
greater  than the loss in utility  for the sacrificing  groups.  But exactly
the  same  applies  to specific  market  control policies.  For example,  a
marketing  quota system can be put into effect which  embodies  essen-
tially the same problem of bringing gains to some groups but losses to
others.
A land withdrawal  scheme  which concentrates  adjustment in one
area gives rise to similar problems.  If farmers in one region are paid
to withdraw their land from production, they receive compensation  to
offset any losses they would  realize.  The smaller  output can raise the
price  and income of farmers in other regions who keep their resources
in farm  production.  Merchants  and nonfarm businesses  in the latter
regions can also gain from the farm income so generated.  But nonfarm
businesses  in the former region  sacrifice  in income as large  segments
of land and labor resources  are withdrawn  from production  and fami-
lies migrate  to  other  locations.  We  have  no  basis for  assuming  that
these nonfarm  persons  are any less important than  those in  other  re-
gions,  or that they are  any less important than  farm people.  Needed,
then,  is  broader  social  policy which  gives  as  much  consideration  to
these sectors  of the  population  as  to agriculture,  or  gives  equal  con-
sideration to all affected  sectors of agriculture.
Such policies  are possible.  They  can  be structured  so  that each
individual makes decisions advantageous to himself.  Required is policy
which allows him choice among alternatives,  with compensation geared
accordingly.  Voluntary  supply  control  or  resource  withdrawal  pro-
grams are of this nature  where they:  (1)  provide  compensation  pay-
ments within  agriculture,  (2)  are on  a scale  to effect  supply control
and resource  transfer in desired magnitude, and  (3)  provide restraints
on  rapidity  of  change  which  protect  the  utility position  of  nonfarm
people, or compensate them  equally with farm people  The individual
who is certain that selling his right to produce deprives him of his free-
dom  and forces  utility reduction  need  not participate.  In any  case  a
policy combining several programs is  needed.
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